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Abstract
In a frequency hopping (FH) scheme users communicate simultaneously using
FH sequences defined on the same set of frequency channels. An FH sequence
specifies the frequency channel to be used as communication progresses. Much of
the research on the performance of FH schemes is based on either pairwise mutual
interference or adversarial interference but not both. In this paper, we evaluate the
performance of an FH scheme with respect to both group-wise mutual interference
and adversarial interference (jamming), bearing in mind that more than two users
may be transmitting simultaneously in the presence of a jammer. We establish a
correspondence between a cover-free code and an FH scheme. This gives a lower
bound on the transmission capacity. Furthermore, we specify a jammer model
and consider what additional properties a cover-free code should have to resist
the jammer. We demonstrate that a purely combinatorial approach is inadequate
against such a jammer, but that with the use of pseudorandomness, we can have a
system that has high throughput as well as security against jamming.
1 Introduction
Frequency hopping is a modulation technique that employs frequency hopping (FH) se-
quences in spread spectrum transmission. This technology was first introduced to allow
multiple users to be co-located within the same spectrum. It also mitigates against in-
terference from unauthorized users, on the assumption that the unauthorised users have
no knowledge of the FH sequences being used [19]. Frequency hopping is widely used
in signal transmission such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and ultrawideband (UWB) communi-
cations [12, 7, 21]. FH sequences specify the frequency channels on which a transmit-
ter/receiver sends/receives data as transmission progresses. The main requirement for
the transmitter-receiver pair to communicate is that they need to be on the same fre-
quency channel at the same time, that is, a communicating pair of users need to share an
FH sequence. When a number of users employ FH sequences which are defined on the
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same set of frequency channels, they form a frequency hopping multiple access (FHMA)
system. We will consider properties of FH sequences for FHMA systems when used in
the presence of adversarial interference.
We will introduce notation and some background as well as related work before de-
scribing our contribution.
2 Background
2.1 Frequency hopping schemes
Let F = {f0, f1, . . . , fm−1} be a set of m frequency channels available to an FHMA
system. We call F a frequency library.
Definition 2.1. A frequency hopping (FH) sequence of length v over F is a sequence
X = (xt)
v−1
t=0 , xt ∈ F , t = 0, . . . , v − 1.
We write X = (xt) if there is no ambiguity.
Definition 2.2. A (v, k,m)-frequency hopping scheme ((v, k,m)-FHS), is a set S =
{Xi : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1} of size k where Xi is an FH sequence of length v over a frequency
library F of size m.
Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS. A transmitter and a receiver share an FH sequence X =
(xt) ∈ S. The channel to be used for transmission/reception at each time slot t is given
by xt.
2.2 Pairwise mutual interference
The use of the same frequency channel at the same time by two FH sequences (or more)
causes interference. Pairwise mutual interference is where two FH sequences in an FH
scheme interfere with each other. It is measured by Hamming correlation. Formally, let
S be a (v, k,m)-FHS and let X, Y ∈ S, X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1) and Y = (y0, y1, . . . , yv−1).
The Hamming correlation HXY at relative time delay τ between X and Y is
HXY (τ) =
v−1∑
i=0
h(xi, yi+τ), 0 ≤ τ < v, (1)
where
h(x, y) =
{
1 if x = y,
0 if x 6= y.
The operations on indices are performed modulo v. When X = Y we write HX(τ)
for HXX(τ) and this is referred to as the Hamming auto-correlation of X . If X 6= Y we
call HXY (τ) the Hamming cross-correlation.
2
We define the maximum out-of-phase Hamming auto-correlation of an FH sequence
X ∈ S as
H(X) = max
1≤τ<v
{HXX(τ)},
and the maximum Hamming cross-correlation between any two distinct FH sequences X
and Y in S as
H(X, Y ) = max
0≤τ<v
{HXY (τ)}.
Further, we define
M(X, Y ) = max{H(X), H(Y ), H(X, Y )}.
Lempel and Greenberger [13] developed the following bound on the maximum out-
of-phase auto-correlation of a sequence:
Lemma 2.3. [13, Lemma 4] For every sequence X = (xt) of length v over F , |F| = m,
H(X) ≥
(v − r)(v + r −m)
m(v − 1)
(2)
where r ≡ v mod m.
For a (v, k,m)-FHS, S, the maximum periodic Hamming auto-correlation of S, Ha(S),
and the maximum periodic Hamming cross-correlation of S, Hc(S), are defined as
Ha(S) = max{H(X)|X ∈ S},
Hc(S) = max{H(X, Y )|X, Y ∈ S, X 6= Y }.
The maximum Hamming correlation of S is defined as
Hm(S) = max{Ha(S), Hc(S)}. (3)
Peng and Fan [17] gave the following bound for the maximum Hamming correlation of a
set of sequences:
Lemma 2.4. [17, Corollary 1] Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS. Let I =
⌊
vk
m
⌋
. Then
Hm(S) ≥
⌈
2Ivk − (I + 1)Im
(vk − 1)k
⌉
. (4)
An FH sequence X is said to be optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger bound if the
bound (2) is met, and a (v, k,m)-FHS is said to be an optimal FH scheme in the Peng-
Fan bound if the bound (4) is met.
There are many FH sequence constructions that are optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger
bound or the Peng-Fan bound. We list a few here that use techniques from algebra, com-
binatorial designs as well as codes. Lempel and Greenberger [13] construct optimal FH
sequences from algebraic transforms of m-sequences. Fuji-Hara et al. [8] provide construc-
tions of optimal sequences using affine geometries, cyclic designs and difference families.
Using cyclotomy as well as quadratic residues, Chung and Yang [4] obtain optimal FH
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sequences with new parameters. Ding et al. [5] employ Reed-Solomon codes to obtain
sets of FH sequences optimal in the Peng-Fan bound. Using cyclotomy and the Chinese
remainder theorem, Ren et al. [20] also obtain sets of FH sequences meeting the Peng-
Fan bound. Ren’s constructions are a generalisation of the constructions in [5] and [25]
which also use cyclotomy over finite fields. Ding et al. [5] also use the trace function
to construct sets of FH sequences that are optimal in the Peng-Fan bound. The FH
sequences constructions given above are all optimal in the sense of meeting either the
Lempel-Greenberger bound or the Pen-Fan bound. However, both bounds are based on
pairwise Hamming correlation. We will explain in Section 2.4 the insufficiency of using
pairwise correlation and propose using Hamming group correlation to measure group-wise
mutual interference.
2.3 Adversarial interference
Interference originating from unauthorised entities where signals are deliberately trans-
mitted to interfere with legitimate transmission is called adversarial interference or jam-
ming. We discuss this in more detail in Section 3.2.
Now we describe the work of Bag et al. [2], Nyirenda et al. [15] and Emek and Watten-
hofer [6] who focused on adversarial interference rather than mutual interference. What
is common across these three constructions is the use of pseudorandomness. However,
the capabilities of the jammers differ. We will elaborate a little on this.
Bag et al. [2] use mutually orthogonal Latin squares to obtain sets of FH sequences.
These FH sequences achieve maximum transmission rate of 100% without adversarial
interference. A transmitter and a receiver share a pair of secret pseudorandom numbers
before the start of communication and uses them for the entire session. The jammer is
assumed to be able to jam at most a certain number of the frequency channels. However,
it was shown in [15] that a jammer only needs to eavesdrop on a single time slot to obtain
the pair of secret shared pseudorandom numbers. This allows the jammer to derive the
FH sequences and thus interfere with any FH sequence of its choice. This weakness was
amended in [15], where it was proposed that there should be a new secret pseudorandom
number for each time slot. We will review one of the schemes of [15] in Section 5 in light
of our model described in Section 3.
Emek and Wattenhofer [6] construct FH sequences as a random walk on an expander
graph. The authors consider a single pairwise communication where subsequent channels
for transmission are included in the data transmitted. A jammer can eavesdrop and jam a
certain fraction of the available frequency channels. In this paper two adversarial models
were considered. In the first model, a jammer can only acquire information about the
channel (but not the content) that was used in previous time slots after a certain number
of time slots have lapsed, while in the second model it has knowledge of both channel and
content. Knowing the transmitted messages is important since the content specifies the
next channels. At any time slot, the FH sequence is guaranteed successful transmission
with some minimum probability. However, it is not clear what happens if more than one
pair (transmitter/receiver) of communication occurs simultaneously.
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2.4 Our contributions
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of an FH scheme with respect to both group-
wise mutual interference and adversarial interference. This framework was introduced
in [15], motivated by the fact that more than two pairs of users may be transmitting
simultaneously in the presence of a jammer. This means that measuring pairwise mutual
interference, while giving some idea of the throughput of the scheme, is not adequate.
An overview of our contributions is as follows. We refine the system and jammer
model which was introduced in [15]. We establish a correspondence between a cover-free
code and an FH scheme. We show that when a cover-free code is considered as an FH
scheme, a user can successfully transmit in at least a specified fraction of time in the
presence of a given number of interfering FH sequences. We specify a jammer model for
an FH scheme. Considering the resources and knowledge of a jammer, we look at how
an FH scheme can mitigate against the jammer. We examine necessary and desirable
additional properties of cover-free codes such that they can be used in the presence of
adversarial interference: a cover-free code allows us to determine the throughput of an
FH sequence in the presence of other interfering FH sequences but not in the presence of
adversarial interference. Finally we discuss the limitations of cover-free codes against a
jammer, and demonstrate that one effective way to improve resistance against a jammer
is to use pseudorandomness.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3 we introduce the system and
jammer model and the necessary notation. In Section 4 we introduce cover-free codes and
show their equivalence to FH schemes. Section 4 also examines the additional properties
of cover-free codes to defend against jamming. In Section 5 in particular we discuss how
pseudorandomness can be used to strengthen cover-free codes to withstand a jammer so
that the FH sequences can be used for longer periods of time. We conclude in Section 6.
3 System and jammer model
3.1 System model
Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS. A single FH sequence is used by a single transmitter/receiver
pair to communicate in the presence of both mutual and adversarial interference. We
first consider the case of mutual interference.
Definition 3.1. The Hamming group correlation G(X,U) between an FH sequence
X ∈ S and the FH sequences in U ⊆ S \ {X}, |U| = w, 1 ≤ w < k, is defined as the
number of time slots in X that use the same frequency channels as the corresponding
time slots of some FH sequence in U :
G(X,U) = |{xt|∃Y ∈ U s.t. xt = yt, t = 0, . . . , v − 1}| . (5)
Note that the Hamming group correlation is a generalisation of Hamming correlation.
When |U| = 1, say U = {Y }, then G(X,U) = HXY (0). Note also that in the following,
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while the definitions and results work for w = 0, we will assume that w > 0 for the idea
of group correlation to be meaningful.
Lemma 3.2. Let S, U , X be as above. LetHm(S) be the maximum Hamming correlation
of S. Then G(X,U) ≤ wHm(S).
Proof. Let U = {Y1, . . . , Yw}. Then G(X,U) ≤ HXY1(0)+· · ·+HXYw(0). Since HXYi(0) ≤
Hm(S) for 1 ≤ i ≤ w, we have G(X,U) ≤ wHm(S).
The notion of Hamming group correlation is the complement of the group distance
defined in [10] when a (v, k,m)-FHS is considered as a set of k codewords of length v
over F . Hamming group correlation G(X,U) gives the number of time slots of an FH
sequence X that are blocked by the FH sequences in the w-subset U of S.
We define a session as being made up of v time slots, that is one full length of an FH
sequence. We now define the throughput of an FH sequence.
Definition 3.3. Let S be a (v,m, k)-FHS. Let X ∈ S and let U ⊆ S \ {X}, |U| = w,
1 ≤ w < k. Then the w-throughput of an FH sequence X with respect to U is the
rate of successful transmission of X in a session in the presence of FH sequences in U :
ρw(X,U) = 1−
G(X,U)
v
. (6)
It is desirable that ρw(X,U) be large, which means an FH sequence transmits success-
fully in many time slots. Here we focus on the worst-case w-throughput of a (v, k,m)-FHS,
which gives the lowest possible throughput over a session in a communication system.
We first look at the case without a jammer. The worst-case w-throughput in the presence
of a jammer will be dealt with in Section 3.2.
Definition 3.4. Given a (v, k,m)-FHS, S, the worst-case w-throughput of an FH
sequence X ∈ S is
ρˆw(X,S) = min
U⊆S\{X}
|U|=w
{ρw(X,U)} . (7)
So, given an FH sequence X ∈ S, (7) gives the minimum number of time slots in
which the FH sequence can transmit data if some other w FH sequences in S are also in
use.
Next we consider the worst-case w-throughput of a particular subset of a (v, k,m)-
FHS.
Definition 3.5. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS and let V ⊆ S, |V| = w + 1. The worst-case
w-throughput of V is the minimum number of time slots in which any X ∈ V can
transmit information if the other w FH sequences in V \ {X} are in use:
ρˆw(V) = min
X∈V
{ρw(X,V \ {X})} . (8)
We conclude with the worst-case w-throughput of an FHS.
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Definition 3.6. Theworst-case w-throughput of a (v, k,m)-FHS, S, is the minimum
of the values ρˆw(V) for each (w + 1)-set V ⊆ S:
ρˆw(S) = min
V⊆S
|V|=w+1
{ρˆw(V)} . (9)
We write (v, k,m; ρˆw(S))-FHS for a (v, k,m)-FHS, S, with worst-case w-throughput
ρˆw(S). For any X ∈ S we can estimate the worst-case w-throughput of X :
Lemma 3.7. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS and let X ∈ S. Then ρˆw(X,S) ≥ ρˆw(S).
Proof. Suppose ρˆw(X,S) < ρˆw(S), that is, there is some (w+1)-subset V ⊆ S containing
X with ρw(X,V \ {X}) < ρˆw(S). This contradicts the definition of ρˆw(S).
Note however, that ρˆw(V) and ρˆw(X,S) are not necessarily comparable. For example,
suppose a (w+1)-subset V containing X satisfies ρˆw(X,S) = ρw(X,V \ {X}). This does
not rule out the existence of an FH sequence Y ∈ V such that ρˆw(V) = ρw(Y,V \ {Y }) <
ρw(X,V \ {X}). Similarly, suppose an FH sequence X satisfies ρˆw(V) = ρw(X,V \ {X}).
This does not rule out the existence of another (w + 1)-subset V ′ ⊆ S with ρˆw(X,S) =
ρw(X,V
′ \ {X}) < ρw(X,V \ {X}).
We can also relate the worst-case w-throughput of an FH scheme with the maximum
Hamming correlation of an FH scheme. Given a (v,m, k)-FHS, S with maximum Ham-
ming correlation Hm(S), we can obtain a lower bound on the worst-case w-throughput
of S:
Lemma 3.8.
ρˆw(S) ≥ 1−
w ·Hm(S)
v
. (10)
Proof. By definition, ρˆw(S) = ρw(X,V \ {X}) for some (w+ 1)-subset V ⊆ S containing
X . The inequality follows from Definition 3.1 and Lemma 3.2.
It also follows from Lemma 3.7 that ρˆ(X,S) ≥ 1− w·Hm(S)
v
.
3.2 Jammer model
We consider the presence of a jammer who sends noisy signals on frequency channels to
block the signal transmissions of legitimate users. The jammer knows F , the (v, k,m)-
FHS, S, and the number of FH sequences used in a session, w+1 (0 ≤ w < k). However,
the jammer has no knowledge of the actual FH sequences to be used. Its strategy is
to eavesdrop and jam. At each time slot it has enough resources to eavesdrop on θ1m
channels, 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1, and jam on θ2m channels, 0 ≤ θ2 < 1. (We assume that it cannot
jam all the frequency channels at each time slot.) It can use the information it acquires
while eavesdropping to make choices of which channels to jam. This jammer is described
as a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. When a signal is jammed, legitimate users hear noise and
acknowledge failure of transmission. So we treat a jamming signal as an erasure. The
goal of the jammer is to reduce the worst-case w-throughput of S.
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(We note here that we have allowed the possibility of w = 0 here, that is, only one
FH sequence is used. While it is not meaningful to talk about correlation when there is
only one sequence, it is still perfectly reasonable for a jammer to want to identify that
one sequence.)
We model a jammer’s channel selection for jamming as a set of FH sequences J =
{Yi|i = 0, . . . , θ2m − 1}, where Yi is an FH sequence of length v over F . We will call J
the jamming sequences.
Definition 3.9. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS over F . Let X ∈ S and let U ⊆ S \ {X},
|U| = w, 0 ≤ w < k. Suppose J is a set of θ2m jamming sequences of length v over F .
Then the (w,J )-throughput of X in the presence of both legitimate FH sequences in
U and jamming sequences J is:
ρw,J (X,U) = 1−
G(X,U ∪ J )
v
. (11)
The rest of the measures introduced in Section 3.1 can be easily modified to measure
the worst case throughput of a (v, k,m)-FHS in the presence of both mutual interference
and jamming. These are summarised in Table 1.
worst-case (w,J )-throughput of
X ∈ S
ρˆw,J (X,S) = min
U⊆S\{X}
|U|=w
{ρw,J (X,U)}
worst-case (w,J )-throughput of
V ⊆ S, |V| = w + 1
ρˆw,J (V) = min
X∈V
{ρw,J (X,V \ {X})}
worst-case (w,J )-throughput of S ρˆw,J (S) = min
V⊆S
|V|=w+1
{ρˆw,J (V)}
Table 1: Performance measures of FH scheme in the presence of mutual interference and
jamming.
Suppose X ∈ S is an FH sequence in use. Clearly if X ∈ J then the jammer would
have succeeded in reducing the worst case throughtput to 0. In Section 4.1 we will discuss
the strategy the jammer might adopt to discover X .
In the literature, jammers are classified according to their capabilities (broadband or
narrowband) and their behaviour (constant, random or reactive) [16, 18, 24]. Our (θ1, θ2)-
adaptive jammer includes these jammers. For example, a broadband jammer means the
jammer jams on contiguous set of channels and so we can consider this as θ2m > 1 and
the jamming sequences Y1, Y2, . . . have neighbouring channels in each time slot. If we
consider a constant jammer who always jams on the same channel(s) fi1, . . . , fimθ2 , then
we have a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer with J = {Yj = (fij , fij , . . . , fij)|j = 1, . . . , mθ2}.
4 Cover-free codes and frequency hopping schemes
We now model a (v, k,m)-FHS as a code and consider the desirable correlation properties
in this light.
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Recall that F = {f0, f1, . . . , fm−1} is the alphabet over which we defined the FH
sequences. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS defined over F . We may treat each sequence of S
as a v-tuple in F v and therefore treat S as a code of length v and size k over F . The
Hamming distance dH(X, Y ) between two codewords X , Y , is the number of places where
the two codewords differ. The following is easy to verify:
Lemma 4.1. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS defined over F considered as a code, and let
X, Y ∈ S. Then dH(X, Y ) = v − HXY (0). The minimum distance dS of S as a code
satisfies
dS = min
X,Y ∈S
{dH(X, Y )} ≥ v −H(X, Y ).
We will call S a (v, k,m; ρˆw(S))-FHS or a (v, k,m; dS)-code (omitting ρˆw(S)and dS if
they are not known) depending on context. Clearly a (v, k,m)-FHS can always be treated
as a (v, k,m)-code and vice versa.
The notion of cover-free codes has been used in [10, 11, 22] for blacklisting and traitor
tracing schemes. In this paper we use the definition of Staddon et al [22].
Definition 4.2. [Cover-free codes[22]] Let S be a (v, k,m)-code. For any subset S ′ ⊆ S
and any X ∈ F v, define:
I (X,S ′) = {i : xi = yi for some Y ∈ S
′}. (12)
Let w ≥ 1 be an integer and let 0 ≤ α < 1. Then S is called (w, α)-cover-free code,
denoted (w, α)-CFC, if |I(Z,S ′)| < (1−α)v for any S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′| = w and any Z ∈ S \S ′.
We see that |I(X,S ′)| gives us the number of “incidents” between X and the code-
words in S ′. If we treat S as a (v, k,m)-FHS, then for S ′ ⊆ S, X ∈ S \ S ′, |I(X,S ′)| is
precisely G(X,S ′) from Definition 3.1. Hence we have a direct correspondence between
an FH scheme with a given Hamming group correlation and a cover-free code.
Theorem 4.3. Let S be a (v, k,m)-code over F , |F| = m. Then S is a (w, α)-CFC if
and only if S is a (v, k,m)-FHS with worst-case w-throughput ρˆw(S) greater than α.
Proof. Suppose S is a (w, α)-CFC. Then, |I(X,S ′)| < (1− α)v for all S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′| = w,
X 6∈ S ′. Since G(X,S ′) = |I(X,S ′)|, we have ρ(X,S ′) = 1 − G(X,S ′)/v > α for all
S ′ ⊆ S, |S| = w, X 6∈ S ′. Since ρˆw(S) = ρ(X,S
′) for some X , S ′ by definition, we have
ρˆw(S) > α.
Conversely, let ρˆw(S) > α. Suppose S is not a (w, α)-CFC, that is, there exist some
Z,S ′, S ′ ⊆ S, |S| = w, Z 6∈ S ′, such that |I(X,S ′)| ≥ (1 − α)v. This implies that
ρ(Z,S ′) = 1 − G(Z,S ′)/v ≤ α. However, by assumption, ρˆw(S) > α ≥ ρ(Z,S
′), which
contradicts Lemma 3.7.
Hence the problem of designing frequency hopping schemes with high throughput is
equivalent to finding cover-free codes with low “incidents”. Note that a (v, k,m; d)-code
is a (1, d/v)-CFC. We are interested in the cases where w > 1. It was shown in [22] that
codes with large minimum distance are cover-free codes.
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Theorem 4.4. [22, Theorem 4.3] Suppose that S is a (v, k,m; d)-code such that d >
v(1− 1
w2
). Then S is a (w, 1− 1
w
)-CFC.
We have the following as a corollary of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4.
Corollary 4.5. A (v, k,m; d)-code with d > v(1− 1
w2
) gives a (v, k,m)-FHS with worst-
case w-throughput greater than 1− 1/w.
Example 4.6. Let v and w be integers where v ≥ 2 and w ≥ 2. Let m be a prime power
such that m ≥ v. Let F be the finite field of cardinality m and let α1, α2, . . . , αv ∈ F be
distinct. Define a length v Reed-Solomon code S over F by:
S =
{
(f(α1), f(α2), . . . , f(αv)) : f ∈ F [X ] and deg f <
⌈ v
w
⌉}
.
Then S is a (w, 1 − 1/w)-CFC code, which is a (v,m⌈
v
w2
⌉, m)-FHS with worst case w-
throughput greater than 1− 1/w.
4.1 Jamming resistance properties for cover-free codes
Theorem 4.3 shows that cover-free codes give FHSs with a guaranteed minimum through-
put without adversarial presence. We now consider how a jammer influences the through-
put of such FHSs. We delve into further properties that cover-free codes should have to
mitigate a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. For simplicity, we assume θ1m = θ2m = 1.
We introduce some terms and notation first.
Let S be a (v, k,m; ρˆw(S))-FHS over F = {f0, . . . , fm−1}. In any session of v time
slots, there are w + 1 FH sequences that are in use by legitimate users. We call these
active sequences. Let S ′′ ⊆ S be the set of active FH sequences. At any time slot t,
0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1, there are at most w + 1 frequency channels in use, which we call active
channels. At any time slot t, let the multiset Ft = {x
0
t , . . . , x
k−1
t } denote all the channels
that appear in all the FH sequences in S at that time. The m-tuple Mt = (a0, . . . , am−1)
denotes the multiplicity of channels f0, . . . , fm−1 at time slot t, where ai = |{j : x
j
t = fi}|.
The aim of a jammer is to reduce the worst-case w-throughput of the FHS. To this
end a jammer would aim to identify an active FH sequence as quickly as possible. It can
then reduce the worst-case w-throughput to 0, or close to 0. We call the jammer’s search
space the set of FH sequences S∗t ⊆ S which the jammer needs to look at to identify
an active FH sequence at time slot t. At the beginning of a session, t = 0, the search
space is the whole FH scheme, S∗0 = S. Let the number of time slots it takes a jammer
to determine an active FH sequence be denoted γv, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. It is desirable that γ be
large. The aim of a (v, k,m; ρˆw(S))-FHS is to make the jammer’s advantage not much
better than a random guess.
We now explore the behaviour of a jammer given S and consider what properties S
should have as a defence. A jammer can trivially reduce the worst-case w-throughput of
S to 0 if S ′′ = S, since all sequences are active and the jammer can choose any X ∈ S to
jam the entire session. As a mitigation strategy we have:
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M1 Use only a fraction of S, that is S ′′ ⊂ S.
If the jammer does not know which sequences or channels are being used then it will
have to guess which frequency channel to eavesdrop on. At time t = 0, there are k FH
sequences assumed to be equally likely over m frequency channels, and for each frequency
channel xi there are ai FH sequences of that frequency channel. The probability that
frequency channel xi is active is:
Prob(xi is active) = 1−
(
k − ai
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
. (13)
The probability in (13) is maximum for a frequency channel xi such that ai ≥ aj for all
i 6= j. Therefore, if there exists such an xi, then a jammer will choose it and will have a
higher chance of jamming an active sequence.
Hence we propose that:
M2 A (v, k,m)-FHS should have the property that all frequency channels used at any
time slot t are uniformly distributed, that is we should have a0 = a1 = . . . = am−1.
Recall that for a ( 1
m
, 1
m
)-adaptive jammer, what happens at time t informs its next action
at time t + 1, therefore we also propose that:
M3 For all FH sequences with frequency channel xi at time slot t, all frequency channels
on the next time slot t + 1 should be uniformly distributed. This forces a jammer
to guess randomly at any time slot.
An FHS satisfying properties M2 and M3 would mean that a jammer has no better
chance of identifying an active channel at any time slot than randomly picking a channel.
Hence we would like our FHS to possess these properties. PropertiesM2 andM3 describe
an orthogonal array:
Definition 4.7. [9] A k × v array A with entries from F , |F| = m, is said to be an
orthogonal array with m levels, strength t′, 1 ≤ t′ ≤ v, and index λ if every k × t′
subarray of A contains each t′-tuple over F exactly λ times as a row. We denoted this
as OAλ(k, v,m, t
′).
Clearly an OAλ(k, v,m, t
′) is also an OAλm(k, v,m, t
′ − 1) and k = λmt
′
.
Suppose we treat an OAλ(k, v,m, t
′) as a (v, k,m)-FHS, S. We want to know how
long such an FHS can resist a jammer, that is, we want to know how many time slots a
jammer would need to identify an active FH sequence.
Consider first the situation where only one sequence is active in S and consider a
( 1
m
, 1
m
)-jammer in our FHS. At t = 0 (or indeed, at any time slot t), every channel in
F appears λmt
′−1 times, so the jammer has no better chance than randomly guessing a
channel x to eavesdrop on. If x is active we will say that the jammer is lucky, otherwise
we say that the jammer is unlucky.
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Now, if the jammer is lucky, that means that the active sequence must be one of the
λmt
′−1 sequences with x at t = 0. Thus the jammer would be able to reduce the search
space for t = 1 to λmt
′−1, by a factor of m. If the jammer is unlucky, then it will be
able to remove from its search space the sequences with x at time t = 0, and on t = 1
continues its search on the remaining sequences in S. The search space would be reduced
from λmt
′
to λmt
′
− λmt
′−1 = λmt
′
(m− 1)/m, a factor of (m− 1)/m. In summary,
Lemma 4.8. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS which is also an OAλ(k, v,m, t
′). Suppose only
one sequence is active in S. Then for a ( 1
m
, 1
m
)-jammer, the size of the search space S∗t
at time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ t′, is given by |S∗t | = λ(m− 1)
Bmt
′−t where B, 0 ≤ B ≤ t ≤ t′, is the
number of time slots in which a jammer has been unlucky.
The jammer continues this action until either an active codeword is identified or the
session ends.
One well-known class of orthogonal arrays is the maximum distance separable (MDS)
codes: An OA1(m
t′ , v,m, t′) is a (v,mt
′
, m; v − t′ + 1)-MDS code. Example 4.6 gives an
example of Reed-Solomon codes which are MDS codes that are both orthogonal arrays
and cover-free codes. In this case we may be more specific:
Corollary 4.9. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS which is also an OA1(k, v,m, t
′). Suppose there
is only one active sequence in S. Then a ( 1
m
, 1
m
)-jammer which is lucky all the time will
be able to identify the active sequence in t′ times slots. Otherwise it will take more than
t′ times slots to identify an active sequence.
However, the analysis above does not apply when there are more than one active
sequence. If the jammer eavesdrop on channel x, say, at time slot t = 0 and is unlucky, it
can rule out all sequences with x at t = 0, hence reducing the search space for the next
time slot. If it is lucky, all it could conclude is that one of the active sequences is one of
the λmt
′
sequences that has x at t = 0. It cannot rule out the possibility that there are
other active sequences that do not have x at t = 0. Therefore it cannot reduce the search
space. However, this is related to the notion of descendants in fingerprinting codes. We
will explore this briefly in the next section.
4.2 Another model of FHS
Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS and suppose w + 1 of the k sequences are in use. Now, the
jammer wishes to identify one of these active sequences. A possible strategy for the
jammer is:
1. Pick the first channel e0 which has the highest number of occurences in S.
2. For t ≥ 1, Record E = (e0, . . . , et−1). Suppose there are t1 active channels at time
i0, . . . , it1−1, and t2 inactive channels at time j0, . . . , jt2−1, t1 + t2 = t.
3. At time t, pick et to eavesdrop on.
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(a) If et is active, compile a collection of subsets of S capable of giving rise to the
active parts of (e0, . . . , et−1, et) and attempt to identify an active sequence.
(b) If et is inactive, compile a subset of S, getting rid of sequences that cannot
possibly be active given (e0, . . . , et−1, et).
Our aim is to design S so that any (w+1)-subset is able to withstand such an attack
for as long as possible, that is, it takes the jammer as long as possible to identify an active
sequence. One possible approach to this is to view S as a code and E as a “descendant”
of subsets of S. An active sequence should belong to some parent set. We will introduce
some notation and terminology here to better discuss this (see [3] for an introduction to
fingerprinting codes).
Let S = {X i = (xi0, . . . , x
i
v−1) | x
i
j ∈ F , i = 1, . . . , k.}. Treat S as a code and X
i
as codewords over F . Let D = (d0, . . . , dv−1). We say D is a descendant of a subset
{X0, . . . , Xw} if di ∈ {x
0
i , . . . , x
w
i } for all i = 0, . . . , v−1. We call {X
0, . . . , Xw} a parent
set of D. These terms are used to define traceability codes and codes with the identifiable
parent property (IPP) - given a word D we can identify at least one codeword in S that
gives rise to D. This finds application in traitor tracing ([3]).
Here we would like the opposite - given a word E obtained by the jammer we would
like the jammer NOT to be able to identify a parent. In addition we would need to
capture the partial and sequential nature of how E is obtained.
Definition 4.10. [Partial descendants and parent sets.] Let i0, i1, . . . , it1−1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , v−
1}, t1 ≤ v. We say that D = (d0, . . . , dv−1) is an (i0, . . . , it1−1)-partial descendant of a set
{X0, . . . , Xw} if dij ∈ {x
0
ij
, . . . , xwij} for j ∈ {0, . . . , t1 − 1}, ignoring all other positions.
We call {X0, . . . , Xw} a t1-partial parent set.
We consider the properties we would like for S that would defend against the jammer
strategy. Considering Step 3(a), we would like the following property:
M4 The intersection of all the t1-partial parent set should be the empty set for as large
a t1 as possible (otherwise an active sequence is identified). This should hold for
all positions (i0, . . . , it1−1).
Considering Step 3(b), we have:
M5 For every inactive channel that the jammer eavesdrop on, if the jammer can discard
some codewords at this step then property M4 should be preserved after expurga-
tion.
It is not clear at this stage how properties M4 and M5 relates to properties of other
types of fingerprinting codes. We can, however, make the following statement about the
Reed-Solomon code of Example 4.6:
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Theorem 4.11. Letm be a prime power such thatm ≥ v. Let δ be an integer, 0 < δ ≤ v.
Let F be the finite field of cardinality m and let α1, α2, . . . , αv ∈ F be distinct. Define a
length v Reed-Solomon code S over F by:
S = {(f(α1), f(α2), . . . , f(αv)) : f ∈ F [X ] and deg f < δ} .
Treat S as a (v,mδ, m)-FHS. Suppose there are w+1 active sequence. If the jammer
eavesdrop at δ(w + 1) + 1 time slots and is lucky in all of them, then the jammer can
determine an active sequence.
Proof. For ease of notation we assume that the jammer was lucky at time slots t =
0, . . . , δ(w + 1) and the active channels are E = (e0, . . . , eδ(w+1)).
Every δ positions determines a unique sequence, so by taking combinations of δ of the
eis we can determine at least (
δ(w + 1)
δ
)(
δw
δ
)
· · ·
(
2δ
δ
)
parent sets, each containing w + 1 sequences.
Since there are w + 1 active sequences, at least one active sequence would have con-
tributed δ of the eis, it will appear in at least one of the parent sets.
Suppose all active sequences contributed the same number δ of ei, then all the active
sequences would appear somewhere in the parent sets, and eδ(w+1) would identify one of
them.
Suppose there is one active sequence that contributes more than δ of the ei then this
sequence would appear multiple times in some parent set and thus would be identified.
On the other hand, if we have a scheme that has propertiesM4,M5, that means that
too many codewords can give rise to E. This implies that too many codewords have the
same symbol at a position, which contradicts the requirement for low correlation. Hence
there is a trade-off between throughput and jamming resistance. This is a subject that
warrants further research. In the next section we consider FHSs that achieve both high
throughput and jammer-resistance, at the expense of computational costs.
5 A secure and efficient FHS
Section 4.1 demonstrates the limits of how secure an FH scheme based on codes can be.
While MDS codes give a guarantee of throughput, they may not resist a jammer for very
long. One possible solution would be to restart the FH scheme every γv time slots. We
therefore propose that in order to withstand the attack of an adaptive jammer, some
form of pseudorandomness must be introduced. Indeed, the schemes in [15] suggests that
pseudorandomness is a necessary component of an FH scheme secure against an adaptive
jammer. We include the description of one of the schemes here to illustrate this. This
scheme is able to withstand an adaptive jammer for the entire session, at the expense
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of additional computational burden, and on the assumption of a secure pseudorandom
number generator.
The “strongly resilient Latin square (sR-LS) scheme” [15] is constucted using a Latin
square:
Let F = Zv, the set of integers modulo v. A Latin square of order v defined over F
is a v × v array L such that no element of F appears more than once in a row or in any
column of L. Suppose x ∈ F . Let L + x = [βij ]v×v where βij = αij + x mod v. Then
L+ x is also a Latin square.
The sR-LS scheme is constructed from a Latin square L = [αij]v×v of order v over F
as follows.
Let K be a long term key shared by all legitimate users. Let g be a pseudorandom
function that takes as input K, the session number s, and the current time slot t, and
outputs an element of F . A slot key xt is generated at each time slot as xt = g(K, s, t).
The FH sequences are given as:
Xi = (βij),
where βij = αij + xt mod v. Note that the sR-LS scheme has v FH sequences used in a
session, and a worst-case (v − 1)-throughput of 1. It can be viewed in two ways,
• A collection of v (v, v, v; 1)-FHS which are MDS codes of minimum distance v,
where each FH scheme is used only once.
• An MDS code with minimum distance 1, that is, a (v, vv, v; 1)-FHS. Only v se-
quences are used and these are determined by the pseudorandom number generator.
It can be seen that in this scheme the v frequency channels at each time slot are unique.
Therefore we have the maximum achievable w-throughput of 1 for any w, 1 ≤ w < v.
Now, consider a ( 1
m
, 1
m
)-adaptive jammer. The jammer has no knowledge of K, as it
is shared by only the legitimate users. Further, a fresh pseudorandom number xt is
generated at each time slot. Therefore a ( 1
m
, 1
m
)-adaptive jammer cannot identify an
active FH sequence being used at a time slot. So we have an FH scheme that achieves
maximum w-throughput of 1 and can withstand a ( 1
m
, 1
m
)-adaptive jammer for the entire
session, that is γv = v.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed FH schemes in the presence of both legitimate sequences
of the system as well as jamming sequences of an adaptive jammer. We have provided
a system model and jammer model where the performance of the FH schemes can be
analysed in the presence of both mutual interfering FH sequences as well as jamming
sequences.
So, it is desirable to know the throughput of an FH scheme under these circumstances.
We explored using cover-free codes as FH schemes as they give a lower bound on the
worst-case throughput. Further we considered mitigating strategies for cover-free codes
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to be used in the presence of jamming. However, we showed that in the presence of our
adaptive jammer, the FH schemes based on cover-free codes do not withstand the attack
for long. With this analysis, and with the example of the strongly resilient Latin square
(sR-LS) scheme proposed in [15] we conclude that pseudorandomness is a neccesity in
providing jamming resistance of FH sequences.
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